Introduction
Multinational finns are perhaps the most important actors in international trade and capital movements. Their importance as exporters and importers is significant, and multinatio nal firms are responsible for the vast majority of direct foreign investment and production abroad (see UNTNC (1988) ).
An international firm considering a direct foreign investment may experience considerable uncertainty over the future profit from that investment. For instance, exchange rate risk may cause the uncertainty of the future profit. A risk averse firm will respond to that uncertainty by adjusting its investment decisions and by taking hedging opportunities into account. 1 The framework of this paper relies upon the approach by WlLLIAMSON (1989) , who argues that a firm has to adapt ca pital in order to make it suitable for the production of its final good. Once adapted, this capital becomes a firm-specific asset. Hence the firm possesses capital, which is intangible, i.e., the capital asset benefits can be made available at little extra cost to domestic and foreign plants, but the asset itself cannot easily be sold in the market. Besides the firm-specific factor is not abundant and has to be allocated internationally. 2 1 BROLL and ZILCHA (1990) . 2 HELPMAN (1984) , ETHIER (1986), and HORSTMANN and MARKUSEN (1989 and n*(ÜT*) are strictly increasing and concave functions in firm-specific capital K and K*, respectively.
The stochastic global profit from home and foreign activities in domestic currency, IP, can be written as
where e is the uncertain spot exchange rate, ej the forward exchange rate and Z* the forward position of the multinational firm. Z* > (<)0 indicates a long (short) position.
The firm maximizes the expected utility of profits with respect to a firm-specific capital constraint K = K+K*. Given the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function Z7, the decision problem reads 3 maxK,z*EU{fi 9 ),
where
The optimal Solution requires the following conditions:
where ILK , TL*K* denote marginal profit functions and U' denotes marginal utility. Owing to the assumed properties of the profit and utility function, these are also sufficient conditions for a unique maximum.
If there exists no forward foreign exchange market we set Let Kf and KJ be the optimal international capital alloca tion in the presence of risk sharing markets, then from equations (3) and (4) we obtain a parity condition:
Hence the forward rate adjusted marginal profits are equal in both markets. This leads to The proof is a direct result of equation (5).
The Separation theorem 4 demonstrates that the decision of the multinational enterprise ab out the international allocation 4 See also BENNINGA, ELDOR and ZILCHA (1985) , KAWAI and ZILCHA (1986), ELDOR and ZILCHA (1987) .
of its firm-specific capital is independent of the utility function or the probability distribution of the random spot exchange rate. This means that any two multinational firms with identical revenue functions and technologies but with different attitudes towards risk and/or different probability beliefs will choose the same international investment policy. However, the hedging behavior of the firm will depend upon its risk aversion and also upon its assessment of the distribution of the spot rate of foreign exchange, or upon its assessment of some parameters of this distribution, at least 5 . This shows Proposition 3. 
Proposition 3 (Optimal Hedging

Proof. The global profit function may be written as IF = n(ÜT) + efZ* + e[W{K*) -Z*J.
Using equation (4), we obtain that
5 This will be illustrated by an example in section 5.
8
If the LHS of (6) is zero, then fl 9 must be independent of e, i.e., Z* = II*(üf*). Similary, if the LHS of (6) Let us include the possibility that the multinational firm invests in the foreign country in a way that improves the marketability of its products. We observe many such cases, for example Japanese manufacturers invest overseas in advertising, dealership, and other services facilities that increase the at-9 tractiveness of their products. 6 In order to include such direct foreign investments (DFI) in our model it is assumed that the foreign profit function depends not only upon the capital allocation K* but also upon direct foreign investments S*:
Let II* be increasing in 5* at a diminishing rate. The marginal profit ITß-* may be (i) increasing in, (ii) independent of, or (iii) decreasing in S*. We will refer to these conditions by naming foreign firm-specific capital and direct foreign investment as 
Let Sf denote the optimal direct foreign investment in the pre sence of forward markets. Then the first order conditions are analogous to equations (3)- (4) and in addition we have
6 See for example SHAPIRO (1989) .
10
The implications are summarized in (TL g )e > 0, we obtain from equation (8) Ws.(K},S'f) = 1.
With optimality condition IIK(K/) = efTL*K*(KJ, Sf) for ca pital allocation it is evident that the Separation property holds. Maximizing U with respect to Z* and rearranging terms the optimal forward contract amount results in
Now let us consider an unbiased forward market, i.e., e/ = Ee.
Then equation (10) The approach containes two factors, firm-specific capital and direct foreign investment, and currency forwards as a hed ging instrument. We assume that all the decisions of the firm, such as direct foreign investment and the allocation of firmspecific capital between the separated foreign and domestic markets are determined ex ante, i. e., before the realization of *1ir -0 an<^ ^ §v~ -0 iff Ee > ej (normal backwardation). 9 See for example SHAPIRO (1989) , BROLL and WAHL (1990) .
14 the random spot exchange rate.
Mainly we investigated the influence of forward markets upon international firm-specific capital allocation, direct for eign investment and the optimal hedging behavior of the mul tinational firm. It was shown that the adverse impact of un- From the preceding analysis of a multinational firm under exchange rate risk an important implication can be derived.
When forward markets exist, risk elements affect only the level of hedging but not the investment decision of the international firm.
